Brown v. Delta Tau Delta: In a Premises Liability Claim, How Far Should the Law Court Go to Assign a Duty of Care? by Franklin, Toby
Maine Law Review 
Volume 68 Number 2 Article 5 
January 2016 
Brown v. Delta Tau Delta: In a Premises Liability Claim, How Far 
Should the Law Court Go to Assign a Duty of Care? 
Toby Franklin 
University of Maine School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Toby Franklin, Brown v. Delta Tau Delta: In a Premises Liability Claim, How Far Should the Law Court Go to 
Assign a Duty of Care?, 68 Me. L. Rev. 363 (2016). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/5 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of 
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
 
 
BROWN V. DELTA TAU DELTA: IN A CLAIM OF 
PREMISES LIABILITY, HOW FAR SHOULD THE LAW 
COURT GO TO ASSIGN A DUTY OF CARE? 
Toby Franklin 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. LEGAL AND POLICY BACKGROUND 
A. The Evolution of Maine’s Premises Liability Common Law 
B. The Foreseeability of Sexual Assault on University Campuses 
III. THE BROWN CASE 
A. Factual Background 
1. DTD Organizational and Regulatory Structure 
B. Procedural History 
C. Arguments on Appeal 
D. Decision of the Law Court 
E. The Concurrence 
F. The Dissent 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Court was Correct to Reverse the Grant of Summary Judgment 
for DTD on the Count of Premises Liability. 
B. The Court Erred in its Decision to Affirm the Grant of Summary 
Judgment for DTDNHC on the Claim of Premises Liability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
  
364 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:2 
BROWN V. DELTA TAU DELTA: IN A CLAIM OF 
PREMISES LIABILITY, HOW FAR SHOULD THE LAW 
COURT GO TO ASSIGN A DUTY OF CARE? 
Toby Franklin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Maine’s premises liability law made an evolutionary leap.  In Maine, 
the elements of a premises liability claim are the same as a negligence claim: duty of 
care, breach of that duty, causation, and harm to the plaintiff.1  Since the late 
nineteenth century, the duty element had remained consistent and predictable: a 
property owner, possessor, or proprietor owes a duty of reasonable care to individuals 
who are lawfully on the premises.2  As a result, premises liability defendants had 
always shared the common trait of owning, possessing, or managing the premises in 
question.3  In Brown v. Delta Tau Delta, the Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the 
Law Court, expanded premises liability to cover a business entity that did not own, 
possess, or manage the premises in question, but nonetheless knew the tort would 
happen.4  The entity foresaw the tort, enjoyed a close relationship with the tortfeasor, 
and had sufficient control over the tortfeasor’s actions.5  Therefore, the entity had a 
duty of care.6  The court reached these conclusions after examining the series of 
events leading to the claim.  This note begins with a discussion of those events. 
In September 2010, Elizabeth Brown was sexually assaulted while attending a 
party at the Delta Tau Delta fraternity house at the University of Maine at Orono 
(UMO).7  She had been invited to the party by Joshua Clukey, a fraternity member.8  
Upon her arrival, Brown encountered Clukey, and asked him if she could store her 
purse in his room upstairs.9  On the way upstairs, Brown and Clukey passed Tucker 
                                                                                                      
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author would like to thank Dean 
Jennifer Wriggins for her valuable guidance on this case note.  The Author would also like to thank his 
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 1.  Durham v. HTH Corp., 2005 ME 53, ¶ 8, 870 A.2d 577.  
 2.  Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 2001 ME 96, ¶ 8, 773 A.2d 1045; Currier v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 680 
A.2d 453, 455 (Me. 1996); Erickson v. Brennan, 513 A.2d 288, 289 (Me. 1986); Poulin v. Colby College, 
402 A.2d 846, 848 (Me. 1979); Ferguson v. Bretton, 375 A.2d 225, 226-27 (Me. 1977); Schultz v. Gould 
Acad., 332 A.2d 368, 371 (Me. 1975); Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d 98, 103 (Me. 1972); Walker v. 
Weymouth, 154 Me. 138, 141, 145 A.2d 90, 92 (1958); Bernier v. Bournakel, 152 Me. 314, 317, 128 A.2d 
846, 848 (1957); Lewis v. Mains, 150 Me. 75, 76-77, 104 A.2d 432, 433 (1954); Shannon v. Dow, 133 
Me. 235, 240, 175 A. 766, 768 (1934); Robinson v. Leighton, 122 Me. 309, 311, 119 A. 809, 810 (1929); 
Parker v. Portland Publ’g Co., 69 Me. 173, 176 (1879). 
 3.  See generally, cases cited supra note 2. 
 4.  2015 ME 75, ¶ 29, 118 A.3d 789. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. ¶ 3.  
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Brown v. Delta Tau Delta, 2015 ME 75, 118 A.3d 789 (No. 
PEN-14-139). 
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Adams, the president of Gamma Nu, the local fraternity chapter.10  When Brown told 
Adams that she was going to Clukey’s room, he laughed and told her that “she didn’t 
want to do that,” but refused to explain why.11  After Clukey and Brown entered 
Clukey’s room, Clukey prevented Brown from leaving, and sexually assaulted her.12 
 The next day, Brown told Adams about the incident.13  Adams admitted to her 
that the fraternity had been concerned about Clukey’s behavior lately, which included 
binge drinking, angry outbursts, property damage, and fights with other fraternity 
members.14  These incidents were violations of the Delta Tau Delta rules and code of 
conduct,15 but the record does not include citations from Gamma Nu for any of these 
violations.  The week following Brown’s report, Gamma Nu cited Clukey for the 
assault, expelling him from the fraternity.16  
In 2012, Brown filed a civil complaint against the Delta Tau Delta national 
organization (DTD), and the Delta Tau Delta National Housing Corporation 
(DTDNHC), asserting premises liability, inter alia.17  Unlike the defendants of many 
previous Maine cases, where one plaintiff would sue one premises owner, the 
Defendants in this case took the form of a more complex legal entity structure.  DTD 
is a national organization that maintains a relationship with its members, and imposes 
a code of conduct on them, but does not own the fraternity house.18  DTDNHC is a 
corporation that maintains no relationship with the members per se, but does own the 
fraternity house and leases it to Gamma Nu.19  Gamma Nu is an unincorporated 
student association, serving as the DTD chapter at UMO.20  In light of this 
organizational structure, the trial court held that under existing Maine premises 
liability law, neither DTD nor DTDNHC owed Brown a duty of care.21  The court 
granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all counts that had not 
been previously dismissed.22  Brown appealed to the Law Court.23 
Faced with a unique type of defendant, the Law Court chose to analogize a 
fraternity’s duty toward its members’ social invitees to a university’s duty toward its 
business invitees.24  Following precedent, the court defined the duty of care to 
include three factors: the foreseeability of the harm, how much control the 
organization had over its members, and the closeness of the relationship between the 
assailant and defendants.25  However, as this was the first premises liability case in 
Maine with a national fraternity organization as a defendant, the court looked to 
                                                                                                      
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 4-5. 
 12.  Id. at 5. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 5-6. 
 15.  Brown v. Delta Tau Delta, 2015 ME 75, ¶ 4, 118 A.3d 789. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. ¶¶ 5-6. 
 18.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. ¶ 1 n.1. 
 21.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. ¶¶ 11, 27; Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 2001 ME 96, ¶¶ 8, 10, 773 A.2d 1045. 
 25.  Brown, 2015 ME 75, ¶ 14, 118 A.3d 789. 
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persuasive authority to determine that the duty of care is “fact-intensive.”26  Applying 
the law to the facts, the court concluded that the establishment of sexual assault 
policies meant that DTD foresaw the assault; that DTD had sufficient control over 
the actions of Clukey through the fraternity’s rules and code of conduct; and that 
DTD maintained a close relationship with Gamma Nu and its members, as DTD 
required all chapters to appoint representatives who would report back regularly to 
the national organization.27  The Law Court reversed the grant of summary judgment 
for the claim of premises liability against DTD, and remanded the case to the trial 
court.28  Then, the Law Court dismissed the claim against DTDNHC, the actual 
premises owner, holding that there was insufficient evidence in discovery to establish 
that the housing corporation had a duty of care toward Brown.29  
In his partial concurrence, Justice Alexander agreed with the court’s holding on 
DTD, but argued that the premises liability claim against DTDNHC should be 
allowed to continue to trial for two reasons.  First, there were sufficient issues of 
material fact as to potential agency between DTD and DTDNHC.30  Second, because 
DTDNHC owned the fraternity house where the assault took place, such a grant of 
summary judgment backpedals on existing law by absolving a premises owner of 
liability for harm sustained on the premises.31 
This Note will address the outcome of Brown in three parts.  Part II will review 
the evolution of Maine’s premises liability common law, and how the policy 
considerations of sexual assault on campus have influenced that evolution.  Part III 
will explain Brown’s relevant facts, procedural posture, the Law Court’s holding and 
rationale, and the concurring and dissenting opinions.  Finally, Part IV will 
demonstrate why the Law Court was correct to reverse the grant of summary 
judgment for DTD on the count of premises liability, but incorrect to affirm the grant 
for DTDNHC on the same claim.   
The court’s holding in Brown represents a necessary evolution of Maine’s 
premises liability common law, and one that the court adeptly applied to the social 
problem of sexual assault on campus and the legal problem of a corporate structure 
designed to limit liability from such assault.  To address these problems, the court 
narrowly expanded premises liability to ensure that, so long as the conditions of 
foreseeability, control and relationship were met, national fraternity organizations 
could be held liable for torts committed against social invitees to fraternity property.  
However, in line with precedent and Maine’s law of alter ego liability,32 the Law 
Court should have held that DTDNHC shared a duty of care with DTD.  By affirming 
summary judgment for DTDNHC, the court left open an avenue through which a 
premises owner can escape liability.  
                                                                                                      
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. ¶¶ 27-28. 
 28.  Id. ¶ 29.  The Law Court vacated summary judgment for DTD, affirmed summary judgment on 
the remaining counts, and affirmed summary judgment for DTDNHC. Id. 
 29.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 30.  Id. ¶ 30. 
 31.  Id. ¶ 36. 
 32.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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II. LEGAL AND POLICY BACKGROUND 
A. The Evolution of Maine’s Premises Liability Common Law  
In 1934, the Law Court heard Shannon v. Dow, the first Maine case to fully 
articulate a property owner’s duty of care under the doctrine of premises liability.33  
In preparation for Fourth of July celebrations, a public garage owner had constructed 
a homemade cannon.34  Unfortunately, the cannon exploded prematurely, severely 
injuring a customer.35  When the customer sued the garage owner for negligence, the 
trial court held for the customer, and the garage owner appealed.36  The Law Court 
affirmed, reasoning that while an invitee is “bound to exercise due care,” the owner 
of a public space must also use “reasonable care” to keep the premises safe for 
invitees.37  If there is any danger on the premises, the owner must warn the invitees 
of that danger.38 
Nearly four decades later, the Law Court approached the issue of premises 
liability on college campuses with Isaacson v. Husson College.39  A college student 
slipped on a patch of ice outside the dining hall at Husson College, falling and 
sustaining injuries.40  The path outside the dining hall was unlit, and the college had 
posted no warnings about ice.41  The trial court held for Husson, finding that despite 
any unsafe conditions, the college had no duty to remove the ice, and therefore the 
student could not recover.42  The Law Court reversed, citing Shannon, and held that 
the college had a duty to oversee the safety of its walkways, especially during 
inclement weather, and to warn students of any unsafe conditions.43  
In Schultz v. Gould Academy, the Law Court first extended Maine’s common 
law of premises liability to sexual assault cases on a school campus.44  An 
unidentified assailant broke into the girls’ dormitory of a boarding school, and 
assaulted a sixteen-year old girl in her room on an upper floor.45  Although the 
watchman on duty that evening had noticed a number of signs to indicate the 
presence of an intruder in the building, the watchman was not permitted to visit the 
victim’s floor.46  Prevented from investigating the problem in person, the watchman 
ceased his investigation and did not report the incident to a higher authority.47  
Schultz sued Gould Academy and won, but the trial court approved the Academy’s 
motion to set aside a verdict in Schultz’s favor, and Schultz subsequently appealed 
                                                                                                      
 33.  Shannon v. Dow, 133 Me. 235, 175 A. 766 (1934). 
 34.  Id. at 766, 175 A. 766. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 768, 175 A. 766. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  297 A.2d 98 (Me. 1972). 
 40.  Id. at 100-101. 
 41.  Id. at 106. 
 42.  Id. at 101. 
 43.  Id. at 106-107. 
 44.  332 A.2d 368 (Me. 1975). 
 45.  Id. at 369-370. 
 46.  Id. at 369 n.3. 
 47.  Id. 
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to the Law Court.48  The Law Court affirmed the original verdict, and introduced the 
concept of foreseeability into the duty analysis of a premises liability claim.49  The 
court held that if the assault was foreseeable “in light of the evidence of an 
unwarranted intrusion,” then the watchman’s “failure to exercise reasonable care” 
made the school liable for any injuries sustained as a result of that failure.50 
While Isaacson and Schultz established a school’s duty of care toward its 
students, the Law Court did not address a fraternity association’s duty toward its 
student members until Hughes v. Beta Upsilon Building Association.51  The fraternity 
in question set up a field for an annual mud football game, and a student member 
sustained serious injuries after diving head first into the muddy field from the top of 
a high wall.52  The trial court granted summary judgment to the fraternity, and the 
student appealed to the Law Court, which affirmed.53  The court made two critical 
distinctions with Hughes.  First, the court added the element of control to the duty of 
care analysis.54  Second, the court distinguished the power of the fraternity to control 
its members from the duty of the fraternity to control those members.55  The court 
reasoned that while the fraternity had the ability to stop the student member from 
diving into the field, it had no duty to exercise that control, because society did not 
recognize that this duty existed between a fraternity and its members.56 
Most recently, in Stanton v. University of Maine System, the Law Court 
considered the holdings from Schultz and the similar Massachusetts case of Mullins 
v. Pine Manor College.57  In Stanton, a student athlete visiting UMO was sexually 
assaulted by a fellow student she had met at a fraternity party.58  Although the trial 
court held there was no established duty of premises liability for a business invitee 
such as this student, the Law Court disagreed, incorporating the relationship element 
into the duty analysis: “[A] duty founded on premises liability exists between a 
student and a college.”59  The court further held that “the law of Maine is that the 
owner of premises owes a legal duty to his business invitees to protect them from 
those dangers reasonably to be foreseen.”60  Citing past examples of on-campus 
sexual assault from Schultz and Mullins, the court held that this incident was 
reasonably foreseeable.61  The court reasoned that the college’s measures to protect 
the students were lacking, in that there were no safety trainings, meetings with 
resident advisors, or posted signs.62 
                                                                                                      
 48.  Id. at 369. 
 49.  Id. at 370, 372. 
 50.  Id. at 371. 
 51.  619 A.2d 525 (Me. 1993). 
 52.  Id. at 525-526. 
 53.  Id. at 525. 
 54.  Id. at 527. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 2001 ME 96, ¶ 10, 773 A.2d 1045.  See also Mullins v. Pine Manor 
Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983) (holding that a college owed a duty of care to protect its students 
against criminality, in the wake of an on-campus sexual assault by an unidentified intruder). 
 58. Stanton, 2001 ME 96, ¶¶ 2-3, 773 A.2d 1045. 
 59.  Id. ¶ 8. 
 60.  Id. (quoting Schultz, 322 A.2d at 371). 
 61.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 62.  Id. 
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The modern doctrine of premises liability in Maine began with Shannon, 
establishing the rule that the premises owner has a duty of care to keep the premises 
safe for any invitees, notwithstanding that the invitees must also exercise due care.63  
The Law Court first applied the doctrine to a university’s duty in Isaacson, a classic 
application of the doctrine in the form of a slip-and-fall case.64  Then in Schultz, the 
court considered premises liability in the context of sexual assault, and decided to 
add the element of foreseeability to the doctrine, given that the tort of assault was 
more nuanced than a fall on an icy pathway in winter.65  The Schultz court also held 
that a university had a duty of care to its students, who held the status of business 
invitees.66  The court defined the limit of the duty of care in Hughes, when a student 
made a completely unexpected decision that led to grave injury.67  In Hughes, the 
court also added the elements of control and relationship.68  Finally, in Stanton, the 
court referenced Schultz and Mullins, acknowledging that sexual assault on a college 
campus could always be considered a foreseeable tort.69  By the time that the court 
heard arguments in Brown, the state of the law was such that a university in Maine 
had a duty of care to protect its students against the tort of sexual assault due to the 
tort’s foreseeability, the university’s close relationship with its students, and the 
university’s ability to control the behavior of those students. 
B. The Foreseeability of Sexual Assault on University Campuses 
The existing body of legislation and research supports the court’s conclusion 
that sexual assault on campus is a visible problem, and one that is readily foreseeable.  
Federal legislation such as the Clery Act70 has reflected the growing awareness of 
the problem of sexual assault on campus.  Congress passed the Clery Act in response 
to the rape and murder of Jeanne Clery, a nineteen-year old female college student, 
in her dorm room in 1986.71  Formally known as the Student Right-to-Know and 
Campus Security Act of 1990, the statute requires United States higher education 
institutions that receive financial aid from the federal government to track and report 
annually on the previous three years of campus crime statistics.72  Since the bill first 
passed in 1990, Congress has continued to expand the Clery Act to meet the growing 
awareness of violence on campus, including sexual assault.73  In 1992, Congress 
                                                                                                      
 63.  Shannon v. Dow, 133 Me. 235, 240, 175 A. 766, 768 (1934). 
 64.  Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d 98, 106-07 (Me. 1972). 
 65.  Schultz v. Gould Academy, 332 A.2d 368, 370-72 (Me. 1975). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Hughes v. Beta Upsilon Bldg. Ass’n, 619 A.2d 525, 526 (Me. 1993). 
 68.  Id. at 527. 
 69.  See Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 2001 ME 96, ¶ 10, 773 A.2d 1045. 
 70.  20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2012).   
 71.  Id. § 1092(f)(18). See also Pennsylvania v. Henry, 706 A.2d 313, 317 (Pa. 1997) (affirming the 
conviction of Josoph Henry for the murder of Jeanne Clery). 
 72.  Clery Act History by Year (1989-2012), CLERY CENTER FOR SECURITY ON CAMPUS, 
http://clerycenter.org/legislative-history (last visited Jan. 29, 2016). 
 73.  Id.  After 1990, Congress continued to expand the Clery Act as it relates to sex crimes.  Clery Act 
History by Year (1989-2012), CLERY CENTER FOR SECURITY ON CAMPUS, http://clerycenter.org/ 
legislative-history (last visited Jan, 29, 2016).  In 1998, Congress amended the Act to expand categories 
and location-based reporting of crimes. Id.  In 2000, Congress added information on how students could 
access information about any registered sex offenders who may reside on campus. Id. 
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passed an amendment to the Clery Act in the form of the Campus Sexual Assault 
Victims’ Bill of Rights.74  The amendment requires colleges and universities to 
develop sexual assault prevention programs in order to remain in compliance with 
the Clery Act.75  
A body of academic research further defines the extent of the problem.  In 2000, 
the National Institute of Justice conducted a survey of 4,446 college women, in which 
they reported that over the course of their first semester, 2.8 percent of these students 
had experienced a rape or attempted rape.76  Extrapolating the results, the survey 
estimated that this number could climb to twenty to twenty-five percent over the 
course of a college career.77  Seven years later, the National Institute of Justice funded 
a more detailed Campus Sexual Assault Study, which produced the result that 13.7 
percent of 5,466 surveyed female undergraduates “had been victims of at least one 
completed sexual assault since entering college.”78  Most recently, in 2015 the 
American Association of Universities published the results of a study involving over 
150,000 students at twenty-seven colleges or universities.79  From this study, 
approximately twenty-three percent of female undergraduates reported experiencing 
nonconsensual sexual contact by force or incapacitation during their undergraduate 
careers.80 Around the same time, a Washington Post-Kaiser Family Foundation poll 
produced similar results, that twenty percent of college women reported a sexual 
assault during their college careers.81  
Finally, the link between sexual assault and alcohol consumption has also been 
documented.  A longitudinal study from 1995-2013 found that forty-seven percent 
of sexual assaults on college students were associated with alcohol use.82  Similarly, 
a 2007 study revealed that the highest sexual assault risk situation for female 
undergraduates is after they become involuntarily intoxicated.83  Studies such as 
these show that alcohol use among undergraduates on campus is linked to an 
increased risk for sexual assault. 
                                                                                                      
 74.  The Federal Campus Sexual Assault Victims’ Bill of Rights, CLERY CENTER FOR SECURITY ON 
CAMPUS, http://clerycenter.org/federal-campus-sexual-assault-victims’-bill-rights (last visited Jan. 29, 
2016). 
 75.  34 C.F.R. § 668.46 (2009).  These programs are designed to “[s]top dating violence, domestic 
violence, sexual assault, and stalking before they occur through the promotion of positive and healthy 
behaviors that foster healthy, mutually respectful relationships and sexuality, encourage safe bystander 
intervention, and seek to change behavior and social norms in healthy and safe directions.” Id. 
§ 668.46(j)(2)(iv).   
 76.  BONNIE S. FISHER, FRANCIS T. CULLEN & MICHAEL G. TURNER, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION 
OF COLLEGE WOMEN 10 (2000). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY 6-1 (2007). 
 79.  DAVID CANTOR, ET AL., AAU CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL 
MISCONDUCT vi (2015). 
 80.  Id. at 23. 
 81.  See Nick Anderson, Scott Clement, College Sexual Assault: 1 in 5 College Women Say They Were 
Violated, THE WASHINGTON POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/local/2015/06/12/1-in-5-women-
say-they-were-violated/ (last visited June 12, 2015). 
 82.  LYNN LANGTON & SOFI SINOZICH, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG 
COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995–2013, at 8 (2014). 
 83.  DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., DRUG-FACILITATED, INCAPACITATED, AND FORCIBLE RAPE: A 
NATIONAL STUDY 3 (2007). 
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III. THE BROWN CASE 
A. Factual Background 
1. DTD Organizational and Regulatory Structure 
DTD is a non-profit organization that represents the fraternity at the national 
level.84  DTDNHC is a non-profit organization that holds DTD’s property, and leases 
fraternity houses to local chapters.85  These chapters include Gamma Nu, UMO’s 
chapter of DTD.86  DTD regulates chapters “through risk management policies, a 
member code of conduct, and oversight by chapter consultants and alumni advisors.87  
DTD’s by-laws include national Member Responsibility Guidelines (MRGs).88  
Those MRGs include DTD’s “Policy on Alcohol and Substance Abuse” and a policy 
on sexually abusive behavior.89 
DTD also has a structured organizational hierarchy.  Local chapters like Gamma 
Nu have an alumni advisor, who serves as a deputy for DTD.90  One of the advisor’s 
responsibilities is to monitor a local chapter and report on the chapter’s level of 
compliance with the by-laws to the DTD leadership.91  Chapter consultants from 
DTD also visit local chapters each semester to evaluate and report potential rule 
violations to DTD.92  In the event of a violation, DTD uses the MRGs for 
enforcement.93  MRGs are divided into three categories based on severity, and the 
violations of MRGs at the highest severity category require expulsion from the 
fraternity.94  All violations of the MRGs must be reported to DTD, and DTD decides 
the sanction(s) to impose on the violating member.95  Apart from the national MRGs, 
DTD requires all members to sign the national code of conduct, which includes rules 
on sexual abuse and alcohol abuse.96  One responsibility of the chapter president is 
to “enforce compliance with the code of conduct and DTD’s rules and regulations.”97  
B. Procedural History 
In 2012, Brown filed suit against Clukey, DTD, and DTDNHC in Maine 
Superior Court, Penobscot County.98  Her amended complaint included counts of 
                                                                                                      
 84.  Brown v. Delta Tau Delta, 2015 ME 75, ¶ 5, 118 A.3d 789. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 90.  Id. ¶ 22. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. ¶ 23. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. ¶¶ 19, 21. 
 97.  Id. ¶ 21. 
 98.  Brown, 2015 ME 75, ¶ 6, 118 A.3d 789.  In the original complaint, Brown named Delta Tau Delta 
Building Corporation (DTDBC) as a defendant.  Later in the litigation process, Brown substituted DTDBC 
for DTDNHC.  DTDBC is a defunct corporation that sold the Gamma Nu fraternity house to DTDNHC 
in 1998.  Id. ¶ 6 n.3. 
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assault, false imprisonment, negligence, premises liability, and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress against Clukey; and counts of vicarious liability, negligence, 
premises liability, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against DTD and 
DTDNHC.99  The Superior Court dismissed Clukey from the case with prejudice in 
2013 following an out-of-court settlement.100  In January 2014, DTD and DTDNHC 
moved to dismiss.  The court granted dismissal on the claim of vicarious liability, 
but denied the motion on all other claims.101   
In March 2014, DTD and DTDNHC moved for summary judgment on the 
remaining claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 
premises liability.102  Following the judgment from Hughes, in which the fraternity 
was found to not have a duty of care, the Superior Court granted the motion on all 
claims.  Like the Hughes court, the court in this case reasoned that premises liability 
was not an issue because neither defendant owed Brown a duty of care.103  Brown 
appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Law Court.104 
C. Arguments on Appeal 
On appeal, Brown argued that when granting summary judgment for DTD, the 
superior court should have held that DTD owed her a duty of care.105  Brown argued 
that the trial court’s reliance on Hughes as a controlling case was incorrect, because 
the circumstances around the injury in Hughes were unforeseeable, unlike the 
foreseeability of the assault in this case.106  Further, Brown argued that DTD, unlike 
the fraternity in Hughes, “did in fact create the dangerous situation in this case by 
failing to enforce its own rules, allowing . . . Clukey to remain a fraternity member 
and thereby setting the stage for his assault of Ms. Brown.”107  Brown argued that 
the court should have followed the precedent from Stanton, that on-campus sexual 
assault was foreseeable.108 
DTD responded by arguing that the court’s grant of summary judgment on all 
claims was valid because neither defendant owed Brown a duty of care.109  DTD 
argued that Stanton did not apply to this case, because DTD’s role was closer to that 
of a landlord leasing a house to tenants, rather than a university responsible for 
ensuring the safety of its students, and because Brown was not actually an invitee of 
the national fraternity.110  DTD also argued that Clukey’s past behavior did not create 
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an indication of foreseeability, specifically that a progression from “drinking, 
outbursts, and fights” to sexual assault was unforeseeable, and that DTD had no 
notice of Clukey’s destructive behavior in the weeks leading to the assault on 
Brown.111  DTD asserted that they were entitled to summary judgment on the 
premises liability claim, as Gamma Nu was the possessor of the fraternity house, not 
DTD or DTDNHC.112 
D. Decision of the Law Court 
First, the Law Court affirmed the trial court’s decision rejecting any vicarious 
liability claims against DTD and DTDNHC, agreeing with the trial court that there 
was no direct agency between Clukey and those organizations.113  Then, the court 
quickly disposed of all claims against DTDNHC, reasoning that there was no 
evidence in the record to indicate that DTDNHC could share DTD’s duty of care.114  
Finally, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for all claims against 
DTD, with the exception of premises liability.115 
The court both applied the precedent from Stanton to this case and used 
precedent from other persuasive authority to extend the duty of care from a university 
to a national fraternity,116 even though the national fraternity did not technically own 
the premises where the tort occurred.117  Additionally, the court extended the duty of 
care from business invitees to social invitees, holding that a national fraternity owed 
a duty of care to its local chapter’s social invitees.118  The court also applied the duty 
framework from Hughes: (1) the incident needed to be foreseeable, (2) the fraternity 
needed to have sufficient control over its members, and (3) the fraternity needed to 
have sufficiently close relationships with those members, in order for the court to 
hold that DTD had a duty of care to Brown.119  If any one of those three elements 
were insufficient, DTD would have no duty of care.  Applying the facts of the case 
to the law, the court decided the issues of foreseeability, control, and relationship in 
the affirmative.120   
E. The Concurrence 
Justice Alexander concurred with the majority, but dissented on the court’s 
decision to affirm the grants of summary judgment against DTD for negligence and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as the court’s decision to affirm the 
grant of summary judgment for DTDNHC on negligence, negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, and premises liability.121  Alexander argued several points: that 
there was a genuine issue of material fact, such that Brown should be allowed to 
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proceed to trial on these claims against both defendants;122 that the majority’s 
decision to find that DTDNHC, the owner of the fraternity house, had no duty of care 
contradicted the nature of premises liability;123 and that there was no substantive 
difference in the elements of a negligence and premises liability claim, such that both 
claims should defeat summary judgment.124 
On the first issue of DTDNHC’s duty of care, Alexander focused on the inherent 
foreseeability of the tortious conduct against Brown.  He asserted that the 
DTD/DTDNHC distinction was a legal strategy designed to limit foreseeable 
liability, and that the circumstances of life in the fraternity house should have led 
DTD to consider the possibility of the tortious act.125  On the second issue, 
contradicting premises liability, Alexander drew a parallel between the university in 
Stanton and DTDNHC in this case in that both served as premises owners.126  
However, the majority still held DTDNHC to a less stringent standard.127  On the 
third issue of the difference between negligence and premises liability, Alexander 
cited the elements of negligence as stated in Stanton in order to illustrate how they 
could bring a trial court to the same conclusion that there was a triable issue of 
negligence in this case: DTD owed a duty of care and breached that duty, and that 
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether DTD’s breach of that duty 
of care was the proximate cause of Brown’s injuries.128 
F. The Dissent 
Justice Clifford dissented from the majority’s expansion of premises liability, 
arguing that DTD had no duty of care to Brown.129  Clifford maintained that the duty 
established in Brown should be no wider than that of Stanton, a case that established 
a duty of a university to warn students of appropriate safety measures in dormitories, 
asserting that the narrowness of the holding in Stanton did not invite an expansion 
of a duty of care from business invitees to social invitees.130   
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Court was Correct to Reverse the Grant of Summary Judgment for 
DTD on the Count of Premises Liability. 
The court was correct to reverse the grant of summary judgment for DTD on the 
count of premises liability, for reasons of public policy and established tort theory.  
On its face, this opinion represents a narrow expansion of premises liability.  After 
Brown, a national fraternity organization may be liable for its member’s tort, 
committed against the local chapter’s social invitee.  Underneath the surface holding, 
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Brown represents a large step in the court’s progressive expansion of premises 
liability, in an attempt to hold the blameworthy parties accountable in increasingly 
complex scenarios of property ownership and management.  This expansion is 
necessary because it serves as an effective response to a nationwide problem of 
sexual assault on campus.131  To reach the decision to make this expansion, the court 
followed a logical process.  The court chose the precedent rooted in the duty to 
protect students from assault, then applied the elements of foreseeability, control and 
relationship to the facts surrounding DTD’s potential liability. 
When analyzing case precedent, the court was correct to incorporate the Stanton 
duty of care and persuasive authority, instead of following the reasoning presented 
by Hughes.  Stanton gave universities a duty of care to keep the premises safe for 
business invitees, but was silent on how that duty would apply to other property 
owners like national fraternity organizations, or to social invitees as opposed to 
business invitees.  The court could have followed the logic from Hughes, which did 
apply specifically to fraternities, in which the court held that a fraternity has no duty 
of care to prevent one of its members from injuring himself in an unforeseeable 
fashion.132  However, the court appropriately held that while the elements of the duty 
of care outlined in Hughes could be adopted here (foreseeability, relationship, and 
control), Hughes was not controlling in this case, because the injury was foreseeable.  
The court was also correct to determine that in order to properly analyze the elements 
of relationship and control, additional case authority would be required.  The court 
analyzed two out-of-state cases and observed that the fraternities in those cases had 
systems in place to control local chapters, and had multiple avenues to establish and 
maintain relationships with the members of those chapters.133  Further, the court 
reasoned that DTD shared those attributes.134 
When applying the duty of care to the facts of this case, the Law Court analyzed 
three elements of that duty: whether the injury was foreseeable,135 whether DTD had 
control over its members,136 and whether DTD had a sufficiently close relationship 
with those members.137  High-level indicators of foreseeability included a record of 
past incidents of violence by Clukey and MRGs that included guidelines against 
sexual abuse by members.138  At a more granular level, the circumstances of the night 
in question include two key facts from which the court could infer foreseeability: the 
presence of a fraternity member to guard the stairway to member’s bedrooms, and 
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the interaction with Adams on that stairway.139  While the court did not incorporate 
past similar cases against DTD, a pattern of prior litigation also suggests that the 
sexual assault on Brown was foreseeable.140  Besides the foreseeability element, the 
court was also correct to hold that DTD had the requisite level of control over its 
members, and a sufficiently close relationship with those members, reasoning that 
the following combined facts serve to fulfill those elements: the extensive MRGs, 
DTD’s constitution and rules, the DTD alumni advisors and chapter consultants, and 
the established reporting process from local chapters to DTD. 
As a result of this decision, the court extended the previously established duty 
of care in Stanton, creating intermediary levels of complexity.  Instead of a 
university’s duty of care, the court made a fraternity accountable, as a fraternity is an 
organization that manages the activities of students who live on university 
grounds.141  Instead of a duty to business invitees of UMO, the court extended the 
duty to social invitees of a University-affiliated local chapter of a fraternity.142   
While the dissent considered this extension an unsupported leap,143 the court’s 
decision is actually in step with the complexity of DTD’s methods to shield itself 
from liability for the actions of its members.  This is not a straightforward 
relationship between a university and its invitees.  The fraternity creates several 
intermediary levels, such as the alumni advisors, chapter consultants, and local 
chapters, in the form of unincorporated student associations.144  Put simply, 
expanding the scope of premises liability was the only way for the court to ensure 
that DTD could not defeat summary judgment, and therefore have a potential breach 
of duty evaluated by a fact-finder at trial.   
The court’s decision is also an effective use of deterrence, an accepted goal of 
tort law.145  By reversing summary judgment for DTD, the court ensured that DTD 
would have to bear the costs of further litigation, potentially extending into a costly 
trial.  Going forward, DTD may find that it is less costly to more efficiently enforce 
its existing policies than to litigate sexual assault claims.  DTD’s stepped-up 
enforcement will hopefully deter future incidents of sexual assault on the property 
of its local chapters, committed against business or social invitees.  However, while 
the court correctly extended premises liability based on public policy and tort theory 
to hold DTD accountable, the court side-stepped both policy and theory by refusing 
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to reverse summary judgment on DTDNHC, the actual premises owner. 
B. The Court Erred in its Decision to Affirm the Grant of Summary Judgment 
for DTDNHC on the Claim of Premises Liability. 
When the court affirmed the grant of the summary judgment for DTDNHC on 
the claim of premises liability, the court made a decision that contravened the history 
of premises liability in Maine, and weakened the deterrence effect of its holding for 
DTD.  Justices Alexander and Clifford may have critiqued this issue from opposite 
sides, but both justices are correct in that this case serves as a unique example of a 
Maine decision where a non-premises owner would be held liable on premises 
liability grounds, while the premises owner would escape such liability.  While the 
court was correct to reverse summary judgment for DTD, the court erred by not going 
further and reversing the grant of summary judgment for DTDNHC on the claim of 
premises liability.  The court had at least three pathways for justifying a reversal of 
summary judgment for DTDNHC.   
First, the same duty of care as articulated in Stanton could still be successfully 
applied to DTDNHC, despite a lack of detail in the record.146  In Stanton, the court 
held that UMO, which owned the dormitory where the assault took place, had a duty 
of care to protect its business invitees from foreseeable harm.147  Similarly, 
DTDNHC owned the fraternity house where Brown was assaulted.148  While 
DTDNHC may or may not be as blameworthy as DTD for the assault, given a lesser-
documented degree of relationship and control between DTDNHC and the fraternity 
members, it would be up to a fact-finder in the trial court to determine exactly how 
much DTDNHC should be liable.  At this stage, when evaluating whether summary 
judgment should be affirmed, it would be sufficient to simply find that DTDNHC 
could potentially have a duty under the theory of premises liability.  
Second, the court could have reversed the grant of summary judgment for 
DTDNHC by recognizing that under the theory of alter ego liability, the two 
corporations should be considered one entity.  Alter ego liability is a theory that 
allows a Plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil under the rationale that due to common 
control, Corporation B is the alter ego of Corporation A.149  In Maine, the courts can 
pierce the corporate veil when a corporation is the alter ego of another corporation.150  
Applying alter ego liability would be an attempt by the court to push back against 
what Justice Alexander referred to as DTD’s “sophisticated legal mechanism . . . to 
immunize its local real estate from court process.”151  Entity structures like the one 
employed by DTD are common across the fraternity industry.152  If the court had 
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used alter ego liability as a rationale for reversing the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment for DTDNHC, this decision could have prevented DTD and other national 
fraternity organizations from employing this “mechanism” in the future.  Further, 
while the entity structure serves as a “legal shield to litigation,” that shield may not 
be indestructible.153  Maine courts will “disregard the legal entity of a corporation 
. . . when necessary in the interest of justice.”154  “The theory of the alter ego has 
been adopted by the courts to prevent injustice, in those cases where the fiction of a 
corporate entity has been used as a subterfuge to defeat public convenience or to 
perpetuate a wrong.”155   
The interest of justice prevails in this case.  The existence of separate corporate 
entities for DTD and DTDNHC, in addition to the unincorporated student association 
of Gamma Nu, have been used at least in part to defeat public convenience, by 
insulating the national organization from tort claims of the fraternity members and 
their social invitees.156  It is much more difficult to find the national organization 
liable for a tort claim when the organization is separated by a housing corporation, 
local chapters in the form of unincorporated student associations, and the individual 
members, who are likely judgment-proof.  The required element of common control 
is evidenced in part by information on DTD’s public website.157  DTD’s Director of 
Business Affairs also serves as the CFO of DTDNHC, and DTD’s Director of 
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Fraternity Programs also manages the operations of DTDNHC properties.158 
Third, the court could have reversed summary judgment for DTDNHC to act as 
a more effective deterrent against future harm.  The court’s reversal of summary 
judgment for DTD is a partial deterrent, but the court’s holding for DTDNHC 
prevents that goal from reaching its full potential.  DTD may be unable to win on 
summary judgment in the future, and may be forced to bear the costs of settlement 
or litigating a trial, but they can also protect their valuable real estate through a 
housing corporation.  DTD may not be sufficiently motivated to enforce its policies, 
because only DTD’s assets are on the line, and DTDNHC’s real property is safe from 
liability. 
The court’s decision to hold that DTD had a duty of care was rational, because 
the harm to Brown was foreseeable, and because DTD had control over the actions 
of its members and sufficiently close relationships with those members to prevent 
the harm from occurring.  However, refusing to assign that duty to the actual property 
owner is a perplexing choice that may degrade the significance of this opinion to 
future Maine courts.  Further, by refusing to give DTDNHC a duty of care under the 
theory of premises liability or the theory of alter ego liability, the court allows DTD 
and similarly situated national fraternity organizations to keep their “legal shields” 
intact.159  Finally, the court’s decision represents a weakened deterrent for DTD.  
While this decision could incentivize DTD and other national fraternities to better 
enforce their rules instead of litigating them, these fraternities can remain assured 
that any assets belonging to their housing corporations will remain unaffected.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Sexual assault on campus is a widely occurring problem, and the courts must be 
able to impose a duty of care on national fraternity organizations, to ensure that a 
fact-finder could hold them liable for how they address such a prevalent problem.  
To that end, the court was correct to expand premises liability in Maine to assign a 
duty of care to a national fraternity organization to protect the safety of the members 
and their invitees.  Although there is a complex corporate structure at work in this 
case, increasingly nuanced facts should be matched by a more nuanced body of law.  
However, in adapting that law, the court should not forget the guiding principle of 
premises liability: that the premises owner has a duty of care to protect its invitees 
from harm.  This should still hold true despite limited discovery on the premises 
owner, because as long as the premises owner has at the minimum been established, 
the duty of care should apply.  The court should also not forget that deterrence is an 
established goal of tort law, and reversing summary judgment for only one of two 
closely-related corporations may not be an effective application of deterrence. Thus, 
the court was correct to reverse the grant of summary judgment for DTD, but erred 
by not doing the same for DTDNHC. 
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